The Momentum to Institutionalize Japan-South Korea-US Ties

Seven U.S. senators were in Seoul and Tokyo in early September as part of a congressional delegation visit to both South Korea and Japan. Such a trip is hardly unique, especially as North Korea’s expanding military capabilities threaten regional security. But this delegation led by Senator Bill Hagerty (a Republican from Tennessee) was striking, and its ambitions to enhance trilateral cooperation were made clear.

The question remains, however, just how attainable such goals may be amid expectations to make relations between the regional powers resilient to political change. The biggest challenge will be to institutionalize military, political, and economic cooperation between the three Indo-Pacific powers so that relations remain strong regardless of domestic constraints.

The United States made its support for this effort clear through the sheer size and diversity of the U.S. delegation that visited South Korea and Japan in September. The race for the White House remains too close to call, and Washington is currently abuzz with speculation about who will be assigned the most prominent Cabinet posts. Chris Coons (a Democrat from Delaware) and Hagerty are often rumored as a potential secretary of state in the case of a Kamala Harris or Donald Trump victory, respectively. The fact that both were part of the seven-person delegation demonstrated U.S. political will to invest that most precious commodity of all, personal time, to further U.S. engagement in Northeast Asia and trilateral ties in particular.

The timing of the congressional delegation’s visit should not be underestimated either. With only weeks to go until a highly contested presidential election, senators are under pressure to campaign for their colleagues, especially in the critical swing states. Taking time away from the campaign trail, even if their own seat is not on the line, is no small feat.

More striking, though, is the fact that the senators had been mobilized to focus on the Indo-Pacific at a time when tensions across the Middle East continue to escalate, and there is still no end in sight to the war in Ukraine. But while Washington confronts immediate foreign policy crises, it is clear that the longer-term strategic concern for the United States remains facing the systemic risks posed by China. Moreover, dealing with the China challenge clearly is still one of the few issues that unites an otherwise often divided Congress. At the same time, there is greater acknowledgement that the United States cannot meet the challenges posed by China on its own.

For the Biden administration, working together with like-minded partners and allies has been at the heart of its foreign policy strategy. Indeed, ahead of the United Nations General Assembly, President Joe Biden made a point of gathering leaders from Australia, India, and Japan in Delaware for the final Quad summit under his watch. For Biden, the meeting was highly personal as he welcomed the leaders of the three countries to his home in Wilmington, marking the first time for Biden to host foreign leaders at his personal residence. The meeting reaffirmed the quadrilateral commitment to counter the rising tide of Chinese influence across the Indo-Pacific. But at the same time, the strength of the Quad can also be seen as its weakness, as it highlighted the role that personal relations have had in cementing ties between the four countries.

Yet not only are Biden’s days in office numbered, but Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio was on his way out even while in Wilmington. Kishida was formally replaced as the head of Japan’s ruling party by Ishiba Shigeru on October 1. With Kishida out of office and Biden soon to follow, the question remains whether their successors will have the appetite and political strength to ensure the strength of the partnership.

The same concern applies to the trilateral between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Of the three countries, only South Korea’s leader will still be in office come February 2025 (his single term lasts until 2027). But Yoon Suk-yeol’s popularity continues to falter in the polls at home. Adding to the political question marks, while international support for strengthening the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral partnership may be strong, it is often received less enthusiastically – if not with outright hostility – at home.

There is a sense of urgency among U.S. policymakers as well as officials from like-minded countries about what will happen following the U.S. elections. The drive to “institutionalize” relations to withstand political changes has become a mantra, but that has not decreased concerns about the election outcome.

Under such circumstances, the role that the private sector can play to pursue cross-border interests should be highlighted. Indeed, one of the strengths of the latest senators’ visit to Seoul was their participation in a trilateral conference focused on the private sector. The conference addressed issues including supply chain resiliency and biosecurity, and it underscored how corporate executives could help bring a pragmatic, profit-focused approach to trilateral cooperation.

The need to institutionalize international cooperation is clear. At the same time, no words from the political leadership of any country can be enough to shake off concerns about the stability of such relations until new leaders themselves articulate their own vision for cooperation. Yet as the challenges countries face require ever more closer cooperation and coordination, the role that the private sector can play to highlight those challenges and draw attention to areas that could benefit from cross-border coordination will only increase moving forward.