Unquiet Flows the Indus

On August 30, India formally notified Pakistan of its request for a “review and modification” of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Due to “fundamental and unforeseen” changes in circumstances, a review of the treaty was necessary, it said.

Drawing attention to the changing realities in the Indus River Basin, India said that “among various concerns,” the “important ones” include demographic changes, India’s need for clean hydropower, and the “impact of persistent cross-border terrorism.”

Indeed, population in the Indus basin has grown by leaps and bounds since the treaty was signed in 1960 by India and Pakistan. The population in the Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir, (J&K) an important stakeholder in the water dispute, for example, has grown from 3.56 million in the 1961 census to 12.5 million according to 2011 census figures, the latest available.

Mediated by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty provides for a division of the waters of the six main rivers of the Indus River Basin between the two countries. It allocates the three western rivers – the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum – to Pakistan for unrestricted use, and allows India to use these rivers for non-consumptive, agricultural, and domestic use. The three eastern rivers – the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej – were allocated to India for unrestricted usage.

This is not the first time that India has sent a notification on the IWT to Pakistan. In its January 2023 notification, it pointed to Pakistan’s lack of cooperation in the treaty’s implementation. However, the concerns India expressed in the January 2023 and August 2024 notifications are not only different, but also they mark an escalation.

The IWT is regarded as one of the world’s most successful transboundary river-sharing agreements. It has survived over six decades and weathered multiple wars and crises. Disputes over the Baglihar Dam and the Neelum project were resolved with the two countries adhering to the processes laid out by the IWT.

However, there is disquiet in both countries.

Under the treaty, Pakistan got 84 percent of the waters of the Indus Rivers system, while India got around 16 percent of the waters. To many Indians this seems like excessive generosity to Pakistan, particularly since India is the upper riparian country. This perception has grown especially in the context of Pakistan’s support for anti-India terrorism in J&K. In 2016, when a major terror attack at Uri in Kashmir left 18 Indian soldiers dead, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “blood and water cannot flow together,” suggesting that river water would not flow into Pakistan if terrorist attacks continued. There were calls in India to scrap the IWT to mount pressure on Pakistan.

The Indus is the backbone of Pakistan’s economy. One of the most water-stressed countries in the world, Islamabad believes it is being shortchanged by India’s building of hydropower projects on the western rivers, which it claims are impeding water flow into Pakistan. It questioned the design of the Kishanganga and Ratle hydropower projects – both run-of-the-river projects with minimal water storage that are allowed under the IWT – on a tributary of the Jhelum and the Chenab in J&K. India’s construction of the Shahpurkandi barrage on the Ravi prompted allegations in the Pakistani media that India was blocking water to Pakistan and was indulging in “water terrorism.” India has full rights over the waters of the Ravi.

The people of J&K are unhappy too. They believe that India bartered away their interests under the IWT. J&K has the potential to produce 20,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity but currently produces just 3,263 MW. J&K suffers from acute power shortages, which could be addressed by developing hydropower on its rivers. J&K could also sell its surplus electricity to India’s northern states if its hydropower potential is fully tapped.

An important point of contention is the dispute resolution mechanism. The IWT provides for a three-stage mechanism – a “question” over treaty interpretation is referred to the Permanent Independent Commission (PIC), which comprises commissioners appointed by the two countries; a “difference” is referred to a World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert (NE); and a “dispute” is referred to a Court of Arbitration (CoA).

India and Pakistan have had “varying experiences” with these mechanisms, explained Bashir Ali Abbas, a research associate at the New Delhi-based Council for Strategic and Defense Research. While India got “a favorable outcome for its Baglihar Project on the Chenab river in 2007 through a NE-led process,” Abbas wrote, “Pakistan secured a CoA-induced obligation in 2013 for India to release the requisite volume of water for Pakistan’s Neelum-Jhelum project. India, too, claimed victory in this decision, which also upheld India’s rights to proceed with the Kishanganga hydropower project,” Abbas pointed out in Frontline magazine.

With regard to Pakistan’s objections to the designs of the Kishanganga and Ratle projects, differences persist despite a CoA decision in 2013. Pakistan asked for an NE solution and then withdrew its request, seeking to turn to the CoA again. India opposed Pakistan’s shift to the CoA, arguing that each step must be fully exhausted before the two sides agree to move to the next step. But Pakistan has moved on without waiting for India’s concurrence.

Meanwhile, the World Bank has further muddied the waters. In 2022, it allowed for the NE and CoA processes to be pursued simultaneously. Pakistan has refused to participate in the NE’s proceedings, and India has stayed away from the CoA hearings.

Frustrated with Pakistan’s stonewalling of its hydropower projects and the prolonged stalemate, India has now called for “reconsideration of the dispute resolution mechanism” under the IWT. It has also suspended the PIC meetings until Pakistan returns to the talks table. The PIC has not met since 2018.

While India is in favor of a renegotiated IWT, Pakistan is not keen on reopening the agreement.

It is not just the growing population that is putting pressure on South Asia’s rivers. The region is already feeling the impact of climate change. The Himalayan glaciers are melting at a rapid pace, leading to severe flooding of rivers as well as water shortages. Contamination of river water is another problem that impacts the amount of water that is available for human consumption. Clearly the realities on the ground are changing, and India and Pakistan need to wake up to this and negotiate a more realistic IWT.