A Litmus Test for Indonesian Democracy

“This is the most pressure Indonesian democracy has been under since the end of Suharto,” said Andreas Harsono, a researcher at Human Rights Watch in Indonesia. The world’s third-largest democracy, he believes, is under threat. 

Since the end of New Order dictatorship in 1998, Indonesia has been a real democratic success story. In a region that has seen many democratic leaders overturned in coups or gradually morph into authoritarian strongmen, the country has avoided that fate. Now, Harsono fears that this hard-won achievement is being eroded.

With Indonesia’s presidential election due February 14, Prabowo Subianto – Indonesia’s defense minister and son-in-law of the former dictator Suharto – is the odds-on favorite to win. By securing President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his running mate, Prabowo has become the president’s heir presumptive. 

Worryingly, state institutions – including the police and the courts – seem to be working to help ensure this is the case. This, combined with Prabowo’s own checkered past, raises serious questions about the trajectory of Indonesia’s democracy.

Recent polls have put Prabowo and Gibran far ahead of their rivals, their support hovering around the mid-40s. Meanwhile, their two opponents  – the former governor of Central Java, Ganjar Pranowo, and the former governor of Jakarta, Anies Basweda, have struggled to make an impact, with most polls putting their support in the low 20s.

Jokowi’s sky-high approval ratings – 76.2 percent in a recent poll – has allowed him to shape the upcoming presidential campaign to a remarkable degree. Ganjar led the polls when the president seemed to favor him, only for Prabowo’s campaign to take off when Jokowi began to signal his support had shifted.

Disturbingly, support for Prabowo also seems to be coming from supposedly neutral state institutions. Gibran was only able to become Prabowo’s running mate due to a last-minute ruling by the Constitutional Court. Under Indonesian law, 36-year-old Gibran was ineligible to run, the minimum age being 40. Just three days before candidates could register, however, the court issued a ruling that carved out an exception for persons with experience in political office, such as mayor. Gibran, it just so happened, had served since 2021 as mayor of Surakarta, also known as Solo – his father’s hometown.

The fact that the chief justice of the Constitutional Court, Anwar Usman, is married to Jokowi’s sister did not pass unnoticed. Anwar has since been censured for ethics violations by fellow justices, stripped of his role as chief justice but not dismissed from the court, and banned from ruling on election cases. The panel not only found him to have violated rules governing conflicts of interest but also said he had misclassified two dissenting opinions as concurring – crudely turning a majority against allowing the exception into a majority for it. Yet, despite the censure the nomination still stands.

The case also signaled decisively to the electorate that the president’s preference had shifted away from the previously favored Ganjar, hitting his campaign hard. Ganjar’s image had hinged on seeming like the president’s natural heir: both coming from outside of the political elite (Ganjar’s father was a policeman), and both members of the PDI-P, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. Hints dropped by the president about his preferences are widely seen as having helped Ganjar secure the nomination from the PDI-P.

The court case threw the race in chaos. 

“It was unthinkable, and then it happened,” admitted Arsjad Rasjid, chair of the Ganjar campaign team and head of Indonesia’s Chamber of Commerce. 

Yet, while Ganjar’s ratings dropped particularly sharply following Gibran becoming Prabowo’s running mate, trouble had set in long before then, with the president signaling a preference for Prabowo as far back as April. 

While the exact reasons remain unclear, rumors swirl of a breach between the president and the PDI-P leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president. Not long before, Megawati had used a party conference to teasingly belittle the president – having long shown signs of discomfort that his brand eclipsed hers. At the same time Ganjar, a party man who joined as a cadre in the 1990s as Megawati battled Suharto for influence, made ostentatious signs of obeisance to Megawati.

Ganjar’s choice of running mate – Mohammad Mahfud Mahmodin, the coordinating minister of political, legal, and security affairs – was meant to woo Nadhlatul Ulama, an enormously influential Islamic organization. But it seems to have done little to arrest the slide in his support. One recent poll even put him in third place, behind Anies Baswedan.

Usually trailing in third in the polls, Anies has struggled to deal with being seen as an opponent of the wildly popular president, and with an association with religious extremism. 

Formerly Jokowi’s education minister, their relationship soured after he was unceremoniously dismissed from the position in 2016. Out of the administration, Anies ran for the governor seat in Jakarta in a deeply controversial election. Belying his reputation as a Western-educated moderate, he allied with both Prabowo and hardline Islamist forces accusing the Chinese Christian incumbent, a friend of Jokowi’s, of blasphemy. The ex-governor, Basuki Purnama, was subsequently convicted and sentenced to two years in jail. To this day Jokowi is said to harbor a personal dislike of Anies.

A perception of extremism from the 2017 campaign still dogs Anies, despite his best efforts. While popular in religiously conservative areas, his ratings among religious minorities – who make up about 12.9 percent of the population – are dismal. To soften his image, he has chosen Muhaimin Iskandar, aka Cak Imin, as his running mate, whose National Awakening Party also has deep ties to the moderately inclined Nadhlatul Ulama. But evidence as to whether this has worked is mixed.

On the record, members of the Anies campaign speak buoyantly about the former Jakarta governor uniting the two key strands of Indonesian Islam – educated urbanites influenced by austere Middle Eastern trends and peasants who keep to more Javanized forms of Islam – under his banner. Off the record, they’ll admit the main hope is that Cak Imin will help prevent Anies from being wiped out in East Java, Indonesia’s second most populous province where Nadhlatul Ulama’s localized Islam holds sway.

Quiet pressure by state institutions on the Ganjar and Anies campaigns may play a part in their polling woes too. Reporting by Tempo, one of Indonesia’s most reputable news outlets, has uncovered cases of local government officials facing pressure from the police when they are seen as backing the wrong campaign. Indonesia’s attorney general has also repeatedly warned that corruption investigations in the country are increasingly being used as political tools.

The Anies campaign, which is positioned in firm opposition to Jokowi, has come under the most sustained pressure. Most notably, the candidate is facing a dragging investigation into Jakarta’s hosting of a Formula E race by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission, which since 2019 has been subject to greater presidential influence.

Intimidation tactics are also apparently being used at a lower level. Speaking to The Diplomat, a member of the Anies campaign team recounted an incident where he organized a small meeting with local activists associated with influential local Islamic schools, trying to persuade them to back Anies. All attendees subsequently received calls from military intelligence suggesting that they should cease such activities and steer clear of him.

The Ganjar campaign has faced similar problems. In November, a house in Jakarta used as campaign center by pro-Ganjar volunteers was raided by police. Speaking off the record, senior figures in the Ganjar campaign say the few actions that have made the news are only the tip of the iceberg. By their account, persons associated with their campaign have faced harassment, canceled venues, and pressure from security forces on numerous occasions.

Still, Ganjar and his campaign team hesitate to make a fuss – perhaps wary of offending a powerful and popular president who has expressed a preference for decorous campaigning. 

In late November, Arsjad, the Ganjar campaign team chair, proclaimed that he was fighting “a massive tyranny” and raised the alarm about possible fraud. Speaking to The Diplomat in mid-December, he avoided repeating any such imprecations. “We trust the institutions. Yes, maybe there are people doing things not following the value of neutrality. But, we believe in the neutrality and we believe we should move forward.”

Some speculate that key PDI-P party figures have given up on the presidential election. Instead, they are focusing on keeping on good terms with Jokowi to prop up their seat share in parliament for post-election bargaining.

If things do not change, it looks increasingly likely that Prabowo may simply win outright in the first round, gaining over 50 percent of votes to avoid a run-off against the second ranked candidate, said Seth Soderborg, an expert on Indonesian polling.

Soderborg admitted he has been surprised by just how dominant a candidate Prabowo has become in the past month. Part of this he puts down to Prabowo’s clear and popular messaging, including promises of free school meals for all Indonesian children and increased subsidies for key goods including fertilizer for farmers. But the Ganjar campaign’s failure to effectively respond to the shift in presidential favor has played a key role too, he argued.

Such a shift is but the latest turn in Prabowo and Jokowi’s labyrinthine relationship. 

Starting as a local businessman and mayor of his hometown Jokowi rose meteorically to become first governor of Jakarta and then a two-term president. Prabowo was a key sponsor of Jokowi’s governor’s bid but ran against him in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, the two most bitterly fought campaigns since Indonesia’s return to democracy. Both times Prabowo initially refused to accept the results. In 2019 this sparked a riot that left eight dead – with Prabowo only conceding when Jokowi offered him the position of defense minister.

Since then, however, the two apparently formed a good working relationship – which has tightened as Jokowi looks for someone to secure his legacy. With his second term coming to an end Jokowi is now constitutionally barred from running again. But key policies of his, including building a new capital city called Nusantara in the heart of Borneo and an attempt to turn Indonesia into an electric vehicle production hub, remain half-finished. 

There have long been signals that Jokowi is looking for ways to extend his influence beyond 2024. Allies of the president floated ideas like extending his term in office or allowing him to run for a third term. Adverse public reaction saw the proposals dropped. By pairing Prabowo with his son Gibran, it looks like Jokowi is hoping to secure his legacy via dynastic means.  

Such tactics are familiar to Prabowo, who secured his position as a presidential courtier under Suharto by marrying the dictator’s favorite daughter. While they have since separated, she is still a member of his political party, Gerindra.

Prabowo’s continued deep association with the Suharto era unnerves many, as does the general’s own complex baggage. Many of his childhood years were spent outside Indonesia after politics forced his father, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, into exile. The family only returned with the coming of Suharto, whom Sumitro served as a minister, playing a large role in orchestrating Indonesia’s economic boom.

Eschewing his father’s scholarly pursuits, Prabowo was reportedly fascinated with the military and national glory. As a child he was once found imitating Charles de Gaulle in front of a mirror. Entering Indonesia’s military, he gained a reputation as a brilliant soldier. Yet his service also saw him associated with some of the regime’s darkest deeds. Troops under his command were credibly implicated in human rights abuses in East Timor and disappearing democracy activists in 1998 as the regime crumbled. 

The last allegation would see Prabowo dishonorably discharged from the army following the end of the dictatorship. He was also banned from entering the United States until 2020, when his role as defense minister made the restriction unsustainable. Yet, returning from exile in the early 2000s he steadily reaccumulated power, aided by his new political party, native charisma, and the enormous personal wealth of his brother.

Along the way he also displayed chameleon-like nature and a ruthless focus on power. The son of a Christian mother, with a Christian brother, and personally secular, he allied with radical Islamist groups who formed key parts of his coalition in 2014 and 2019. On a personal level, associates say that he can be charming, but he is also known for his volcanic temper. In September this year he was rumored to have assaulted a fellow minister – though the claim was dismissed by both him and the president. One young political professional admitted that he and other young associates patronized by Prabowo would jokingly refer to him as “Don Corleone,” the titular character in “The Godfather.”

In the latest election, though, Prabowo softened his image. The radical Islamists that once helped mobilize support for him have been sidelined. And, while he still deploys tub-thumping nationalist rhetoric attacking nebulous foreign threats supposedly plotting against Indonesia this is no longer so central to his campaign. 

Instead, he has cultivated an image that is grandfatherly and even gemoy, cute. In the minds of many Indonesians under the age of 40 – who make up 52 percent of the electorate –  Prabowo seems to be known not for his checkered past but for social media posts that show him cuddling animals, doing TikTok dances, or rendered as a chubby baby-like cartoon reminiscent of off-brand Pixar. The younger the voter the more likely they are to support Prabowo.

Should Prabowo win, Indonesia’s transactional politics means he should have little difficulty assembling a governing majority. What he then does with it, though, is less clear. He has promised continuity with Jokowi, but his relatively short tenure actually holding public office means much about his own preferences and governing style is opaque.

Still, some key themes have emerged. Since taking over the Defense Ministry in 2019 he has overseen a spending spree to modernize Indonesia’s military forces. On the campaign trail he has signaled his desire to continue with this military buildup.

Prabowo seems keen to turn the spending taps in other areas as well. On top of promising increased spending on state subsidies, he has launched attacks on unnamed “neoliberal” ministers reluctant to fund programs for the poor. The target is assumed to be Indonesia’s veteran finance minister, the fiscally cautious Sri Mulyani. Her dismissal combined with a sharp uptick in spending could roil markets. While Indonesia’s debt remains low, the economy is facing pressure from rising interest rates in the United States and slowing demand from China.

Accusations of graft that have arisen during Prabowo’s time in office only add to governance concerns. Most notably, a huge army-led project to try and bolster Indonesia’s food self-sufficiency ran aground. Thousands of acres of forest were suddenly cleared, handed over to the management of a little-known company, and attempts to cultivate the land apparently failed. Yet, Prabowo still seems keen on the idea – often stressing that self-sufficiency in food is part of national security on the campaign trail.

Much may depend on precisely how much influence Jokowi can exert once out of office. While Gibran would be a foot in the door, it is far from clear if this will amount to significant practical influence. As in many political systems, the duties of the vice president tend to be unclearly defined, depending mainly on what the president is willing to delegate. 

Jokowi’s current vice president, the elderly and respected cleric Maruf Amin, has played only a limited role in the administration. Jusuf Kalla, who was a powerful vice president under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, saw his influence steadily shrink between 2014 and 2019 when he served in the role during Jokowi’s first term. A 36-year-old whose main claim to power is his family name could prove easy to freeze out.

Yet, if a sidelined Gibran is a possibility, so too is his suddenly being thrust into the highest office given Prabowo’s relatively advanced age. According to reliable sources, when attending Singapore’s Shangri La Dialogue in 2022 Prabowo requested that a special “rest room,” complete with a bed, be set up near the conference area for him, saving him a longer walk to and from his hotel room. Should Prabowo’s health fail, the prospect of dealing with a chief executive whose relevant governing experience is a handful of years as mayor of a small city is already causing anxiety in policymaking circles in Jakarta.

“You have to think about deeper questions of governance too,” said Kevin O’Rourke, head of the political risk consultancy Reformasi Information Services. The strain on key parts of Indonesia’s democratic settlement, independent and neutral state institutions, may well intensify. A bill that would remove two of the Constitutional Court’s most independent justices recently proposed in Indonesia’s parliament, though, seems to have since lost traction.

Prabowo himself has long hinted at a desire to revisit certain key aspects of the post-1998 democratic settlement, critiquing “Western style” democracy. Earlier in December, a bill in parliament dealing with moving Indonesia’s capital also proposed making Jakarta’s governor a presidentially appointed position, the same system used to choose governors a under the New Order. 

This bill too seems to have lost traction, but its mere proposal is a worrying sign. Making governors and mayors directly elected has been a key part of Indonesia’s democratization, letting outsider talents break into Indonesian politics – including, once upon a time, Jokowi himself. It is hard to imagine Indonesia’s rowdy voters swallowing attempts to remove their ability to elect these officials. 

But, as Prabowo’s remarkable rise from disgraced exile to likely next president attests, in Indonesia things once thought buried can yet rise again.