Gregory Poling

In the second half of 2023, reports of incidents between Chinese and Philippines vessels in the South China Sea began piling up at an alarming rate. Chinese vessels used water cannons on and collided with Philippine ships seeking to resupply an outpost on Second Thomas Shoal, which is also claimed by China. Manila reported “swarming” of other disputed reefs by Chinese fishing vessels and maritime militia. The Philippine government has made clear that it expects these clashes to continue and even escalate in 2024.

The Diplomat’s editor in chief, Shannon Tiezzi, interviewed South China Sea expert Gregory Poling on the China-Philippines disputes, the strategy of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., and the role of the Philippines-U.S. alliance.

Poling, the director of the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), noted that these tensions have been simmering for over a decade. “The deepening U.S.-Philippine alliance is a symptom of China’s behavior in the South China Sea, not its cause,” Poling said.

In October, November, and December there were a spate of reported run-ins between Chinese and Philippines vessels near disputed maritime features in the South China Sea, including several collisions. Is the frequency of such encounters new, or just “new to us” in the sense that the Philippines didn’t previously publicize these incidents?

A little of both. The frequency and intensity of these run-ins has definitely increased, and began doing so from spring 2022. But China has maintained a daily coast guard patrol around Second Thomas Shoal – the site of these incidents – since late 2013 and has regularly deployed maritime militia boats around it since at least 2018. China has also blocked or harassed Philippine resupply missions to the troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal on many occasions under both the previous Aquino and Duterte administrations. But during the latter, Manila did its best to sweep those under the rug.

In spring 2022, the Duterte government was undeniably tilting back toward the United States and more forcefully complaining about China’s ongoing harassment. As a result, the China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia began harassing every single resupply mission to the shoal at that time. They backed off briefly after President Marcos was inaugurated on June 30, 2022, but that lasted only until October, at which point it was clear he wouldn’t be softening the Philippine position. Quite the opposite in fact.

So the CCG and militia began harassing resupply mission again, and the missions grew a bit more frequent as Manila determined more materials were needed to shore up the BRP Sierra Madre, the rapidly deteriorating grounded ship on which its troops are based. China also began using more dangerous forms of coercion, including a military-grade laser to blind a Philippine crew in spring 2023 and intentionally navigating unsafely, which led to three collisions in October and December. Most recently, China deployed a long range acoustic device to disorient a Philippine crew in early December (at Scarborough Shoal in that case).

China has expressed displeasure with the Philippines over its deepening alliance with the U.S. Beijing is particularly concerned about Manila opening bases in northern Luzon to U.S. forces under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), as those bases are close to the Taiwan Strait. Is China retaliating against Manila in the South China Sea over these concerns, or are these actions China would be taking anyway to preserve its claims?

The deepening U.S.-Philippine alliance is a symptom of China’s behavior in the South China Sea, not its cause. China has been harassing Philippine resupply missions for more than a decade and has been steadily increasing the number of vessels employed and the intensity of their coercive tactics for at least the last five years. That trend has accelerated in the last year and a half, in part because first Duterte and then Marcos determined that meekness wasn’t accomplishing anything and so began running the blockades around Second Thomas more frequently and more publicly.

But you don’t blame the victim for reporting abuse; China is responsible for its own illegal and violent behavior, not the Philippines for refusing to surrender.

How has the Marcos administration changed the Philippines’ approach to the South China Sea disputes? Do you think the Philippines’ position in the region has been strengthened as a result?

The Marcos government has launched two major initiatives simultaneously. The first is launching a policy of transparency led by the Philippine Coast Guard and the National Task Force on the West Philippine Sea. Manila has for the first time in years developed a disciplined public messaging campaign on the South China Sea issues, contrasting its lawful and peaceful pursuit of claims with China’s illegal and violent pursuit of “historic rights” to the entire sea.

The Philippine Coast Guard has effectively documented each case of China Coast Guard and militia harassment, releasing photos, drone footage, and other data, and inviting civilian news crews aboard resupply missions. This has helped galvanize Philippine public opinion, countered disinformation (both domestic and foreign), and convinced about two dozen states to publicly support the Philippines’ claims and demand China comply with the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award.

The second initiative is deepening the U.S.-Philippines alliance and other partnerships to deter Chinese aggression and help modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines. That trend began in the latter days of the Duterte administration, especially during Secretary [of Defense] Austin’s first trip to Manila in June 2022 when Duterte agreed to revoke his threat to end the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement. But it became much more deliberate under Marcos. When the two sides met at the end of 2022 for their first in-person Bilateral Strategic Dialogue since the pandemic, they issued an ambitious Join Vision Statement for a 21st Century U.S.-Philippines Partnership. Among other things, that document laid out five key efforts to modernize the alliance and make it more equal (a frequent demand of both Duterte and Marcos administration officials).

They pledged to increase U.S. support for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; implement and expand the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement that allows U.S. forces to construct facilities, preposition equipment, and rotate through select Philippine military; launch a new maritime security dialogue to coordinate responses to Chinese “gray zone” coercion short of armed force; negotiate their first ever set of Mutual Defense Guidelines; and conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). They managed the first four in just 18 months and continue to work on the GSOMIA. Meanwhile the Philippines has deepened military cooperation with Australia and Japan in particular, and to a lesser degree other Asian and European partners.

These efforts have been very successful. They have rallied more support for the Philippine position in the South China Sea than it has ever had, pulled the U.S.-Philippines alliance from a historical anachronism to an effective modern pact, and stymied Chinese efforts. Despite the growing risk of collisions and other violence around Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, Beijing has utterly failed to find an effective way to deny the Philippines access to either without resorting to military force, which would undermine its wider regional and global ambitions. China has backed itself into a corner with no good options, and the Philippines continues to do assert its rights and maintain its positions despite the gross imbalance in power between the two sides.

The United States has reiterated its defense commitment to the Philippines after close encounters with Chinese vessels. Has the U.S. been playing a role directly in the disputes? How does this compare to past approaches by Washington to China-Philippines tensions, for example during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff?

The clarification of the U.S. defense commitment to the Philippines is the fundamental difference between earlier approaches to the South China Sea, including the perceived failure of the U.S. response to the 2012 Scarborough Shoal seizure by China, and today’s more effective coordination.

U.S. officials were publicly unclear about whether and how the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applied to the South China Sea (though it is important to note that U.S. officials had quietly assured Filipino counterparts for decades that attacks on vessels in disputed waters would trigger defense obligations, if not necessarily on disputed islands). President Obama famously traveled to Tokyo and specified that the U.S.-Japan treaty covered the Senkakus, then visited Manila and danced around the question of the South China Sea. The contrast was deeply unnerving for Filipinos and allowed alliance skeptics like Duterte to insist that the Americans were unreliable.

That didn’t change until 2019, when Secretary of State Pompeo flew to Manila and specified that the treaty would cover any attack on Filipinos anywhere in the South China Sea. President Biden and Secretaries Austin and Blinken have since reiterated that at every turn, assuring Manila and deterring Beijing.

But it is important to note that the United States has been standing behind the Philippines, doing only what Manila asks; no more, no less. This highlights a key difference between the U.S. and Chinese conception of the South China Sea and the region at large. Washington recognizes Philippine agency in defending its own rights, while Beijing insists that Manila (and all smaller states) are mere puppets on the international stage who need not be taken seriously.

A U.S. patrol aircraft is often overhead during Philippine resupply missions to collect intelligence and let China know that the U.S. is watching and willing to intervene if the Philippines is attacked. But the Philippines leads these operations. There are no U.S. vessels running supplies to the Sierra Madre and no U.S. ships patrolling Scarborough Shoal.

Despite that, every time a Chinese ship rams or otherwise harms a Philippine ship and Manila understandably files a diplomatic protest, Beijing ignores it and howls about the U.S. stirring up trouble. It is not hard to imagine how infuriating that is for Philippine leaders and citizens.

How are other claimants in the South China Sea disputes interpreting the developments between China and the Philippines?

The other claimants are, as always, being circumspect in their public pronouncements. But the tougher Philippine stand has happened in parallel with less-remarked-upon efforts by the Indonesian, Vietnamese, and Malaysian governments to stand up to Chinese coercion around key oil and gas fields. Since late 2020, the China Coast Guard and militia have persistently used similar gray zone tactics against drilling by all three states and, like the Philippines, each has realized that they can call China’s bluff without provoking an escalation to armed force.

Meanwhile, the Vietnamese government seems quietly supportive of Philippine efforts and the Indonesian security services and parts of the civilian bureaucracy are of a similar mind. I fully expect even more alignment between Jakarta and Manila, and perhaps even a public endorsement of the arbitral award, following Indonesia’s 2024 elections.

Looking ahead, what do you think happens to Second Thomas Shoal as the BRP Sierra Madre continues to deteriorate, potentially to the point that it can no longer support a rotating contingent of Philippine troops?

There are only two options: the Philippines can repair or replace the ship, or it can watch it fall into the ocean, followed in all likelihood by a Chinese occupation of the reef. The Philippine government isn’t going to let the latter happen. So look for the current dynamics to continue, with the Philippines at least bringing in a steady stream of construction materials and potentially even taking a bolder step by replacing the ship with a more sustainable outpost.

In either case, it seems likely but by no means assured that the Philippines would manage the operation despite Chinese coercion, just as it has every month in 2023. Manila has been examining its options and even called on the U.S. for technical advice, so I expect the moment of truth will come pretty soon.